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MONITORING WOMEN’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY UNDER ICESCR 
 
Abstract 
 
Little attention has been paid to the monitoring tools of women’s socio-economic rights (SER). Can 
the established monitoring tools used by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) be reformed to detect all the ways women’s SER are undermined or is it more 
conceptually sound to establish a new gender equality monitoring standard? This article argues for 
both approaches. Incorporating a gender equality framework into traditional monitoring tools 
enriches accountability. To detect the complex ways women experience violations of their SER it is 
necessary to develop an independent evaluative tool. This article proposes that Fredman’s four 
dimensional model of equality be used for monitoring women’s rights under ICESCR.  
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)1 has an ambivalent 
position to women’s equality. On one hand, Article 2(2) provides that socio-economic rights are 
guaranteed without discrimination on the basis of sex and Article 3 specifically requires states to 
ensure men and women equally enjoy socio-economic rights. On the other hand, gender 
assumptions permeate ICESCR: for example, the right to an adequate standard of living is based on 
the male breadwinner model.2 The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
through an evolutionary interpretation has made strides in dismantling the male bias in ICESCR3 
and is working towards engendering socio-economic rights.4 This process, however, is only just 
beginning and much remains to be done. 
 
Up till this point, the focus has been on reshaping the normative content of socio-economic rights 
so that ICESCR better responds to women’s experiences.5 Less attention has been paid in 
developing monitoring tools to assess if the state has fulfilled its obligations under Article 2(2) and 
Article 3 of ICESCR. Without explicitly considering the state’s implementation of women’s socio-
economic rights, there is a real risk that gender inequalities will remain invisible. Achieving gender 
equality is complex. Measures designed to promote women’s socio-economic rights can in effect 
perpetuate gender stereotypes or re-entrench disadvantage. It is imperative to carefully evaluate the 
implementation of women’s socio-economic rights.6 This article asks: what monitoring standards 
need to be reformed or developed by CESCR to ensure that women are equally able to enjoy their 
socio-economic rights? 
 
Asking this question opens the Pandora’s Box of measuring compliance with socio-economic rights. 
Chapman warns that ‘monitoring state compliance is a complex and exacting process with numerous 
political and methodological pre-requisites.’7 CESCR has pioneered the concept of the minimum 
core and with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to ICESCR (OP-ICESCR) it is now poised to 
contribute to the development of the reasonableness standard.8 All of these standards have been 
praised and criticized. But none of these evaluative tools have been designed to capture gender 
inequalities and the relationship between monitoring ICESCR and equality has largely been 
unexplored. Can gender equality be integrated into established monitoring standards or is it more 
conceptually sound to established a new and separate monitoring standard? This article argues that 
both approaches should be simultaneously pursued. Enriching the current monitoring approaches 
with equality is essential to uphold women’s socio-economic rights. For both principled and 
pragmatic reasons, it is also necessary to develop a separate equality monitoring tool so as to be able 
to identify all the ways women experience violations of their socio-economic rights. While there 
have been prior proposals for monitoring gender equality under ICESCR, this article proposes that 
                                                 
1 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).  
2 ibid. Article 11.  
3 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 16: The equal rights of men and women to the equal enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights’ (2005) E/C.12/2005/4. 
4 Sandy Fredman, ‘Engendering Socio-Economic Rights’ (2009) 25(3) SAJHR 409, 409. 
5 ibid; Leilani Fahra, ‘Is there a Woman in the House? Re/conceiving Women’s Right to Housing’ (2002) 14 Can J 
Women & L 118.  
6 Dianne Otto, ‘“Gender Comment” Why Does the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Need a 
General Comment on Women?’ (2002) 14 Can J Women & L 1, 43-51.  
7 Audrey R. Chapman, ‘A ‘Violations Approach’ for Monitoring ICESCR’ (1996) 18 HRQ 23, 24. 
8 A/RES/63/117 (entered into force 5 May 2013). 
Fredman’s four dimensional model of substantive equality offers the ideal framework for CESCR to 
employ.9  
 
The article begins by providing context on the role of CESCR in ensuring compliance with 
ICESCR. The second part maps CESCR’s current approach to monitoring to understand how 
equality can fit into this process. The third part explains that even though CESCR has made 
reference to certain aspects of gender equality, there is still a need for gender sensitive monitoring 
standards. The fourth part analyses how the various monitoring standards are able to grapple with 
gender inequality in the implementation of socio-economic rights. It argues that incorporating 
gender equality into the current evaluative tools and developing an independent equality monitoring 
framework are necessary to detect the complex ways women experience violations of their socio-
economic rights. The fourth part, using Fredman’s four dimensional model of substantive equality, 
sketches the contours of an equality-based standard and concludes by demonstrating how this can 
enrich the monitoring of ICESCR.   
 
 
I. The Role of CESCR 
 
CESCR is not a judicial body.10 This formal position belies the important authoritative role that 
CESCR can play in developing socio-economic rights. The guarantees in ICESCR are open-textured 
and CESCR provides guidance so that states know the scope of their obligations.11 Through a multi-
faceted accountability structure, CESCR shines an analytical spotlight on places where the state has 
not fully implemented ICESCR. Through engaging in constructive dialogue with the state, civil 
society organisations and now under the OP-ICESCR, the individual, CESCR proposes 
recommendations on how to best implement ICESCR.   
 
(i) General Comments 
 
Although the General Comments are the preeminent method for CESCR to elucidate ICESCR, 
there is no reference to the General Comments in the treaty. Upon a standing request from the UN 
Economic and Social Council, CESCR has drafted numerous General Comments on the obligations 
in ICESCR. The General Comments develop the legal obligations in the treaty, identify barriers to 
socio-economic rights and share information on best practices.12 CESCR explains that the goal is to 
provide a detailed analysis of specific rights in ICESCR and assist states in fulfilling their 
obligations.13 The General Comment do not merely provide a conceptual analysis of ICESCR, states 
are directed to respond to the General Comments in the periodic reporting process.14 The 
accountability mechanisms are meant to form a coherent and harmonious structure. Thus, the  
                                                 
9 Otto, supra note 6 at 45-51; Christine Chinkin, ‘Gender and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Eibe Riedel et al 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (OUP, 2014) 157-58. 
10 Walter Kalin, ‘Examination of state reports’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: 
Law and Legitimacy (CUP, 2012) 35. 
11 Urfan Khaliq and Robin Churchill, ‘The protection of socio-economic rights: a particular challenge?’ in Helen Keller 
and Geir Ulfstein (eds) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (CUP, 2012) 205. 
12 Helen Keller and Leena Grover, ‘General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their legitimacy’ in Helen 
Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (CUP, 2012) 125. 
13 CESCR, ‘Report on the Forty-Fourth and Forty-Fifth Session’ E/2011/22-E/C.12/2010/3’ [55]. 
14 Report of Secretary General, ‘Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to Be Submitted By 
States Parties to The International Human Rights Treaties’ (2009) HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 [29]. 
standards and monitoring approaches articulated in the General Comments should filter into the 
remaining accountability mechanisms.   
 
(ii) Periodic Reporting Process 
 
Under Article 16 and 17 of ICESCR states must submit a report to CESCR ‘outlining the factors 
and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment’ of socio-economic rights. State reports are 
notorious for being incomplete and self-congratulatory.15 To supplement these shortcomings, 
CESCR encourages CSOs to submit shadow reports. CESCR conducts a written and oral dialogue 
session with the state. The Concluding Observations highlights positive areas of development, 
expresses areas of concerns and provides recommendations. This process is designed to be self-
reflective, to facilitate meaningfully dialogue between CESCR, the state and CSOs and encourage 
good practices.16   
 
(iii) Optional Protocol 
 
Under the Optional Protocol, CESCR examines complaints that the state has violated ICESCR.17 
Unlike the General Comments and Concluding Observations, the OP-ICESCR mandates that the 
CESCR assess these complaints on the basis of reasonableness. CESCR does not release legally 
binding judgments but communicates its views and provides recommendations. There is a process for 
inter-state communications and an inquiry procedure into grave and systemic violations of ICESCR 
but this has not yet been utilized.18  
 
II. A Multi-Faceted Approach to Monitoring 
 
With this contextual backdrop in place, the first step in assessing the best practice for CESCR to 
monitor women’s socio-economic rights is to analyze CESCR’s approach to monitoring ICESCR. 
CESCR employs a multi-faceted strategy, as it uses several different standards. Arguably it is also 
incoherent and conceptually confusing as CESCR has not provided any theoretical explanations for 
how these standards operate together. In part, this is because each of the evaluative tools used by 
CESCR is in response to different critiques of socio-economic rights. There was never any over-
arching design or plan on how to best monitoring the implementation of ICESCR and the result is 
an often perplexing array of monitoring standards. Equally challenging, there is a disconnection 
between the standards set in the text of the treaty, those advocated for in the General Comments 
and monitoring in the Concluding Observations and Individual Communications.  
 
This section briefly sketches the various standards drawn upon my CESCR, the critiques of each, 
and the relationship between these different monitoring tools. The aim isn’t to resolve these debates 
but to map out the different approaches so as to have the necessary base to understand the role 
equality plays in monitoring ICESCR. It uses the two latest General Comments from 2016 on the 
right to just and fair working conditions and the right to sexual and reproductive health, the 
Concluding Observations from the March 2016 reporting round (Canada, Kenya and Namibia) and 
the two decisions decided on their merits under OP-ICESCR. Only these latest outputs for CESCR 
                                                 
15 ibid at para 22-32; Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (OUP, 2013) at 768. 
16 CESCR, General Comment No. 1 Reporting by State Parties’ (1989) E/1989/22; Kalin supra note 12 at 39-40. 
17 Article 8, OP-ICESCR 
18ibid, article 10-11. 
are used; while this limits the extent of the conclusions and forecloses an evolutionary assessment, it 
does give a detailed snapshot of CESCR’s current approach.  
 
(i) Maximum Available Resources and Progressive Realization 
 
The starting point is Article 2(1) of ICESCR. It holds that: ‘each state...undertakes to take steps...to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of [socio-
economic] rights.’ First, under maximum available resources CESCR needs to ascertain the entire 
resources of the state and assess how much of these resources should be devoted to the realization 
of socio-economic rights.19 Second, under the progressive realization element CESCR needs to 
develop benchmarks and indicators to assess if the state has moved sufficiently fast enough to fully 
realize socio-economic rights. Progressive realization recognizes that it may take time to fully realize 
socio-economic rights.20 While it is a necessary ‘flexibility device,’21 it still imposes an obligation to 
immediately or within a reasonably short time take concrete ‘steps towards’ realizing socio-economic 
rights.22  
 
In the General Comments, CESCR only makes passing reference to this standard. Under the 
heading of “maximum available resources”, CESCR expresses concern about Canada’s stagnating 
levels of social spending and low corporate tax rates23 and in relation to Kenya on levels of 
corruption in the public sector, illicit financial flows and tax avoidance.24 There is no reference to 
maximum available resources in the Concluding Observations for Namibia. A fully developed 
maximum available resources test would involve a detailed analysis of the resources and budget of 
the state to determine if a sufficient portion of its resources were directed towards socio-economic 
rights, not merely flagging areas of under-spending or corruption. In respect to progressive 
realization, CESCR only recommends that Canada, Kenya and Namibia ‘take steps to progressively 
develop and apply appropriate indicators on the implementation of economic, social and cultural 
rights.’25 This falls far short of the robust analysis required under Article 2(1) of ICESCR. As has 
been noted before, this is because these are highly contextualized standards. The time and energy 
needed to assess both the maximum available resources and the progressive realization for each of 
the 164 states parties to ICESCR is beyond the capacity of CESCR.26 Therefore, CESCR has 
developed other tools to ensure states are held accountable under ICESCR.      
 
(ii) Minimum Core and Core Obligations 
 
In partial response to concerns that socio-economic rights are imprecise and only programmatic, 
CESCR pioneered the concept of the minimum core.27 CESCR holds that there is a ‘minimum core 
                                                 
19 David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights (CUP, 2008).   
20 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 3: The nature of the state’s obligation’ (1990) Fifth Session, [9] 
21 ibid.  
22 ibid.  
23 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (2016) E/C.12/CAN/CO/6 [9]-[10]. 
24 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations: Kenya’ (2016) E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5 [17]-[18] 
25 ibid [65]; ‘Concluding Observations: Canada’ (n 23) [62]; CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations: Namibia’ (2016) 
E/C.12/NAM/CO/1 [78].  
26 Chapman supra note 7 at 28.  
27 Craig Scott and Patrick Mecklem, ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guaratnees? Social Rights in a New 
South African Constitution’ (1992) 141U of Penn L Rev 1; Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (OUP, 2008) at 
84.  
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
right.’28 It illustrates the concept by holding that when a significant number of individuals are 
deprived of food, primary health care, housing and basic education then the state is in violation of 
the minimum core obligation under ICESCR.29  
 
The concept of the minimum core has been contentious in theory and practice. Proponents argue 
that it gives a determinacy to socio-economic rights.30 It provides a litmus test.31 To achieve this aim 
it is necessary to articulate what is meant by “minimum.” There have been various proposals, the 
most prominent being survival, dignity and consensus-based. In her seminal critique of the 
minimum core, Young argues that these definitions are insufficient. Focusing on the minimum 
socio-economic rights necessary for survival conceptualizes a very narrow understanding of life and 
‘misses the connection between dignity and human flourishing.’32 However, equating the minimum 
core to dignity is equally problematic as dignity is an elusive concept that cannot be easily defined, 
making it difficult to determine what minimum level of socio-economic rights are necessary for a 
dignified life.33 In respect to consensus-based definitions, aside from the methodological concerns 
on determining consensus, it connects the minimum core to the lowest common denominator.34 
Attempts to concretize the minimum core rather than providing guidance have only lead to further 
problems.  
 
Although CESCR has historically been at the vanguard of the minimum core, in practice CESCR 
has not truly applied this doctrine. There is no reference to the minimum core in the Concluding 
Observations. In the General Comments on the right to just and fair working conditions and the 
right to sexual and reproductive health, the CESCR holds that ‘state parties have a core obligation to 
ensure, at the very least, minimum essential levels of satisfaction of the right...’35 CESCR, in effect, is 
by-passing the debates on the content of the minimum core by omitting to tie it to any normative 
standard.  
 
Instead CESCR lists core obligations for specific socio-economic rights. Core obligations ‘outline 
the necessary steps of “operationalizing” rights...[and] seeks...to signal violations under [ICESCR].’36 
The core obligations approach has been criticized as being ad-hoc and following ‘a meandering 
course of logic.’37 The core obligations for the right to just and fair working conditions include: 
combating gender discrimination and harassment at work; establishing minimum wages; developing 
a health and safety policy; enforcing minimum working standards.38 In respect to sexual and 
reproductive health, CESCR holds the core obligations include: repealing laws that criminalize 
access to sexual and reproductive health services; universal and equitable access to sexual and 
reproductive health service; legal prohibitions on gender-based violence; preventing unsafe 
                                                 
28 ‘General Comment No. 3’ supra note  20 at 10.  
29 ibid at para 10.  
30 Bilchitz, Fundamental Rights supra note 19 at  162. 
31 Katharine G. Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ (2008) 33 
The Yale J of Int’l L 113, 121.   
32 ibid. 130.  
33 ibid. 135. 
34 Chapman supra note 7 at 148. 
35 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 22: The right to sexual and reproductive health’ (2016) E/C.12/GC/22 [49]; 
CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 23: The right to just and fair working conditons’ (2016) E/C.12/GC/23 [65]. 
36 Young supra note 31 at 152.  
37 ibid. 154. 
38 ‘General Comment No. 23’ supra note 35 at [65]. 
abortions; access to comprehensive sex education; provision of medicines, equipment and 
technology for sexual and reproductive health; and access to remedies for violations.39 It is difficult 
to discern a coherent explanation that unites the different facets of the core obligation, especially 
when comparing the core obligations between the right to just and fair working conditions and the 
right to sexual and reproductive health.  
 
In the Concluding Observations, CESCR does not explicitly use the term but it does express 
concern that states are not fulfilling various core obligations identified in the General Comments. 
However, it does not consistently evaluate state’s compliance with the core obligation. While for 
Canada, Kenya and Namibia, CESCR expressed concerned about minimum wage, there is no 
reference to harassment at work.40 In respect of sexual and reproductive health, in Canada and 
Kenya it raised the issue of access to abortion, but not in Namibia.41 In Kenya, CESCR discussed 
sex education and the cost of giving birth, it held Canada to task for the cost of contraception and in 
Namibia it focused on HIV/AIDS and sterilization.42 There has recently been tension in Canada 
between religious groups and the state on the delivery of sex education43 and there is limited access 
to abortion in Namibia,44 so it is surprising that these issues, identified as core obligations in the 
General Comments, were not discussed by CESCR in the Concluding Observations.   
 
(iii) Respect, Protect and Fulfil 
 
Traditionally, civil and political rights were conceptualized as exclusively creating negative duties of 
restraint while socio-economic rights imposed positive duties. A significant amount of scholarship 
and case law has debunked the distinction between civil and political rights and socio-economic 
rights and has shown that both types of rights give rise to negative and positive duties.45  
 
CESCR, adopting Shue’s typology,46 holds that each right gives rise to duties to respect, protect and 
fulfil. This was first used by CESCR in 1999, in the General Comment on the right to food.47 Using 
sexual and reproductive health as an example; the duty to respect ‘requires the state to refrain from 
directly or indirectly interfering with individual rights.’48 For instance, states need to decriminalize 
same-sex sexual activity. The duty to protect ‘requires states to take measures to prevent third  
parties from directly or indirectly interfering with rights.’49 This includes regulating the conduct of 
private healthcare facilities, insurance and pharmaceutical companies. And finally, the duty to fulfil 
‘requires states to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and 
other measures to ensure the full realization of the right.’50 This requires, inter alia, the state to 
                                                 
39 ‘General Comment No. 22’ supra note 35 at para 49. 
40 ‘CO: Canada’ supra note 23 at 25; ‘CO: Kenya’ supra note n 24 at para 29; ‘CO: Namibia supra note 25 at para 34.   
41 ‘CO: Canada’ supra note 23 at para 51; ‘CO: Kenya’ supra note 24 at para 53.  
42 ‘CO: Canada’ supra note 23 at para 51; ‘CO: Kenya’ supra n 24 at para [53]; ‘CO: Namibia’ supra note 25 at 67. 
43 Pete Baklinski, ‘Christian private school rejects Wynee’s sex-ed as “perverse”’ (14 July 2015) 
<https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/christian-private-school-rejects-wynnes-sex-ed-as-perverse>. 
44 Jack Kenyon, ‘The Abortion Discussion’ (8 August 2014) 
<http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=126629&page=archive-read>. 
45 Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (n 27); Plattform ‘Arzte fur as Leben’ v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 204. 
46 Henry Shue, Basic Rights (PUP, 1980) 51. 
47 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food’ (1999) E/C.12/199/5. 
48 ‘General Comment No. 22’ supra note 35 at para 40. 
49 Ibid at para 42. 
50 Ibid at para 45. 
eradicate barriers such as the cost to sexual and reproductive health care and to address prejudices 
on menstruation, pregnancy, masturbation, sexuality and fertility.  
 
In the General Comment on sexual and reproductive health, CESCR links this typology to violations 
under ICESCR. Under the heading “Violations”, CESCR uses the respect, protect and fulfil model 
to illustrate how the state is in contravention of the treaty. Chapman has argued for a separate 
violations approach to ICESCR that looks at the: (i) actions of the state (ii) patterns of 
discrimination and (iii) failure to fulfil the minimum core, but CESCR has not adopted this model.51 
Going a step further, CESCR connects the obligation to fulfil to the progressive realization standard: 
“violations of the obligation to fulfil also occur where States fail to progressively ensure sexual and 
reproductive health facilities, goods and services available.”52 The link between obligations to fulfil 
and progressive realization are not explored in detail. Connecting these two standards can be deeply 
problematic as many of the obligations to fulfil are closely related to gender equality, such as 
maternal health care, which are an immediate obligation.53 This tension is explored further in Section 
IV. Confusingly, in the General Comment on just and fair working conditions, CESCR does not use 
the typology of duties but rather identifies “Violations” as acts of commission and omission.54 
  
In the Concluding Observations, similar to core obligations, there is no direct reference to the 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil. However, CESCR does appear to draw on this typology. 
The General Comment on the right to just and fair work requires, as part of the obligation to 
protect, requires the state to pass laws on the minimum wage55 and in the Concluding Observations 
for Canada, Kenya and Namibia, CESCR makes a similar recommendation.56 It echoes the 
obligation to fulfil as explained in the General Comment on sexual and reproductive health when it 
recommends that Kenya provide sex education and that Namibia focus on delivering HIV services.57 
But like the core obligations, CESCR does not consistently hold states accountable to the obligation 
to respect, protect and fulfil. There is no reference to the state regulating health care and 
pharmaceutical companies in the Concluding Observations which CESCR identifies as an obligation 
to protect.  
 
(iv) Reasonableness 
 
The OP-ICESCR empowers the individual to hold the state accountable for failing to uphold the 
rights in ICESCR. Under Article 8(4) when deciding the individual claim, CESCR ‘shall consider the 
reasonableness’ of the state’s actions in implementing ICESCR and ‘shall bear in mind that the 
[state] may adopt a range of policy measures.’ This introduces an additional monitoring standard: 
reasonableness. It was adopted to ensure that CESCR did not unduly interfere with the state’s 
economic, social and cultural laws, budgets and policies.58 
 
                                                 
51 Chapman supra note 7 at para 43. 
52 ‘General Comment No. 22’ supra note 35 at para 62 [emphasis added]. 
53 UN Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law and Practice, ‘Discrimination against women in 
economic and social life, with a focus on economic crisis’ (2014) A/C/26/39 [8]. 
54 General Comment No. 23 supra note 35 at paras 77-80. 
55 ibid at para59. 
56  CO: Canada’ supra note at para 25; ‘CO: Kenya’ supra note 24 at para 29; ‘CO: Namibia supra note 25 at para 34.   
57 ‘CO: Kenya’ supra note 24 at para 53; ‘CO: Namibia supra note 25 at para 67. 
58 Malcolm Langford, ‘Closing the Gap? –An Introduction to OP-ICESCR’ (2009) 27(1) Nordic J of Hmn Rts 2, 25. 
Reasonableness in the context of socio-economic rights has been primarily developed by the South 
African Constitutional Court. In a series of cases, the Court has fleshed out the reasonableness 
standard to include: ‘the levels of rights provisions, speed of progressive realisation and budget 
appropriations... planning, monitoring, meaningful engagement and prioritisation of vulnerable’ 
groups.59 Critics argue that this standard is too deferential to the state and does not adequately 
define the content of socio-economic rights.60 There have been concerns that reasonableness has 
resulted in the proceduralisation of socio-economic rights.61 Proponents argue that it is sufficiently 
robust. Porter notes that ‘the reasonableness standard imposes obligations on all actors to make 
decisions that are consistent with a firm commitment to the progressive realization of [socio-
economic rights]’62 while Liebenberg and Quinot hold the state needs to adopt ‘a rights-conscious 
policy, planning and budgeting process.’63  
 
CESCR has not had much opportunity yet to apply this new standard. It has only decided two 
individual communications and in neither case did CESCR articulate a fully-fleshed out conception 
of reasonableness. In IDG v Spain, it determined that there were other possible measures the state 
could have taken to provide notice regarding the enforcement of a mortgage.64 In Rodriguez v Spain, 
CESCR held that reducing a prisoner’s non-contributory disability benefit by an amount equivalent 
to the cost of his upkeep in prison was not a violation of ICESCR.65 It noted that the reduction is a 
reasonable means of allocating state resources.66   
 
Prior to the OP-ICESCR coming into force, CESCR held that in reviewing the state’s measures on 
the grounds of reasonableness it will assess whether the: 
• Measures are targeted towards the fulfilment of ICESCR 
• Measures are non-discriminatory  
• Allocation of resources in accordance with international human rights standards 
• Measures are the least restrictive 
• Measures are taken in a reasonable time frame 
• Measures take account of disadvantaged and marginalized groups 
• State prioritised grave situations  
• Measures are transparent and participatory67 
 
(v) The Relationship Between Monitoring Standards 
 
                                                 
59 Brian Griffey, ‘The “Reasonableness Test” for Assessing Violations Under OP-ICESCR’ (2011) 11(2) HRLR 257, 316.  
60 Bilchitz, Fundamental Rights (n 19) Chapter 5. 
61 Dennis Davis, ‘Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards “Deference 
Lite”?’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 301; Marius Pieterse, ‘Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights’ 
(2004) 20 SAJHR 383, 410-1. 
62 Bruce Porter, ‘Re-thinking Progressive Realization: How Should it be Implemented in Canada?’ (2015) Social Rights 
Advocacy Centre 7 
<http://www.socialrights.ca/documents/publications/Porter%20Progressive%20Implementation.pdf> .  
63Geo Quinot & Sandra Liebenberg ‘Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative Justice and Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa’ (2011) 22(3) Stellebosch L Rev 639, 641.   
64 (2015) E/C.12/55/D/2/2014. 
65 (2016) E/C.12/57/D/1/2013. 
66 Ibid at para 13.3. 
67 CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligations to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under OP-
ICESCR’ (2007) E/C.12/2007/1.  
The relationship between these different standards is far from clear and there appears to be 
significant overlap. Turning to the most prominent standards in the General Comments: core 
obligations and respect, protect and fulfil, CESCR uses identical examples to illustrate these two 
standards. As seen above, laws on minimum wage are classified as both core obligations and 
obligations to protect. But there is not a perfect overlap between these two standards. Under the 
obligation to fulfil states are encouraged to establish non-contributory social security programmes 
for informal workers, but this is not identified as a core obligation. Thus, there is some substantive 
difference between these standards but precisely how they differ is not readily apparent. The time 
element may be a possible difference: core obligations are immediately enforceable whereas the 
typology of duties, particularly the obligation to fulfil, has been linked to progressive realization. 
However, CESCR has not explored this in any detail. In the Concluding Observations, when the 
standards do overlap, CESCR does not articulate the type of violation. On what basis does CESCR 
conclude that social assistance rates are inadequate in Canada: core obligation or obligation to 
fulfil?68 Furthermore, despite the multiple standards developed in the General Comments, in the 
Concluding Observations it is often unclear what, if any, standard CESCR is using to identify areas 
of concern. This contradicts the CESCR’s own advice to take account of the General Comments in 
the periodic reporting process. As another layer of confusion, when discussing “Violations” CESCR 
draws on the typology of duties, acts of commission/omission and progressive realization, but it 
makes no reference to core obligations.  
 
Prior to the OP-ICESCR there was no prominent role for the maximum available 
resources/progressive realization standard. Reasonableness under OP-ICESCR may have reactivated 
these standards as resource allocation and the time frame for achieving socio-economic rights are 
facets of reasonableness. There are glimmers of this in Rodriguez where CESCR accepted the state’s 
allocation of resources as a reasonable use of public funds. But how does reasonableness fit with 
core obligations and respect, protect and fulfil? The individual decisions make no mention of these 
other standards. Griffey optimistically observes ‘that reasonableness has not changed the obligations 
imposed by the [ICESCR].’69 Similarly the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) had held that reasonableness was always a part of the maximum available 
resources/progressive realisation standard.70 But CESCR does not meaningfully employ these 
standards in the General Comments or Concluding Observations, so there is still uncertainty on 
how reasonableness functions with the evaluative tools it actually uses. If the state has failed to 
achieve a core obligation or violated the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil could this amount to 
unreasonableness under ICESCR? 
 
Searching for a unifying conception to monitoring of ICESCR is arguably futile as the different 
standards it uses are in response to different, albeit interlocking, problems related to, inter alia, the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights. Although Bilchitz has observed that it is difficult to uncover 
CESCR’s precise reasoning, it is possible to identify general motivations.71 Maximum available 
resources/progressive realization acknowledges the role of budgets and time in the implementation 
of ICESCR. The minimum core/core obligations aim to give a determinacy so as to be easily able to 
identify breaches of ICESCR. The typology of obligations demonstrates that similar to civil and 
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political rights, there are elements of socio-economic rights that are immediately enforceable. And 
lastly, the reasonableness standard recognizes that the state has the discretion to employ a range of 
measures.  
 
In sum, CESCR uses all of these methods concurrently to enhance socio-economic rights. 
Monitoring ICESCR is multi-faceted and equal parts robust, confusing and pragmatic. In practice, 
CESCR ignores the monitoring standards established in the text of treaty and has developed its own 
approach. It primarily relies on the core obligations and the typology of duties, but it is not 
consistent in applying these standards when reviewing the state’s implementation of ICESCR. There 
are many potential explanations for these inconsistencies: information provided by the state or 
CSOs in the periodic reporting process, the interests of individual members of the Committee or 
even the politics of the international human rights system. The goal here is not to understand the 
root causes of the Committee’s inconsistent use of these standards but simply to grasp the 
Committee’s different approach to monitoring. With this map in place, it is now time to turn to see 
if CESCR is able to use this multi-faceted approach to comprehensively hold state’s accountable for 
women’s socio-economic rights.    
 
 
III. The Need for Gender Sensitive Monitoring Standards 
 
A cursory glance at the General Comments and Concluding Observations suggests that even in this 
chaotic monitoring framework, CESCR is able to monitor women’s socio-economic rights. Many 
times it expresses concerns on women’s rights. A careful analysis, however, reveals that without a 
gender equality framework, either integrated into the current standards or as a stand-alone 
framework, CESCR is not able to comprehensively monitor ICESCR from a gender perspective. 
Although, the observation that CESCR has not fully engendered ICESCR has been made before, 
this has largely been made in relation to the normative content of the rights in the treaty.72 This 
section briefly analyses the Concluding Observations from Canada, Kenya and Namibia and the 
latest two General Comments to make the case that part of the problem is that CESCR has not 
adopted a gender sensitive approach to monitoring women’s socio-economic rights.    
 
On the positive side, the latest General Comments make numerous references to how women 
experience violations of the right to fair and just working conditions and the right to sexual and 
reproductive health. CESCR identifies key ways that women’s rights are undermined—maternal 
mortality, lack of access to abortion, forced marriage and marital rape—and provides 
recommendations on how these issues can best be addressed—repealing laws, ensuring access to 
information, goods and services, and addressing stereotypes.73 Similarly in the General Comment on 
the right to just and fair working conditions, CESCR calls on states to address the gender wage gap, 
sexual harassment, maternal and parental leave, the working conditions of domestic workers and 
unpaid work.74  
 
The problem is that CESCR has never articulated or explicitly used any tools to explain why these 
are violations of Article 2(2) (non-discrimination), Article 3 (equality), Article 7 (right to work) and 
Article 12 (right to health) of ICESCR. The areas of concern that CESCR emphasize and its 
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recommendations of best practice highlight crucial areas of gender inequalities but CESCR fails to 
articulate with any degree of precision a background theory explaining why the examples provided 
undermine ICESCR. The General Comments are essentially just examples of gender inequalities. A 
example helps illustrate this problem. In the General Comment on the right to sexual and 
reproductive health, CESCR notes that substantive equality requires that the ‘barriers that particular 
groups may face [need to be] addressed.’75 Gender stereotypes on care giving roles are identified by 
CESCR obstacles to women’s equal right to sexual and reproductive health.76 It is correct to note 
that cultural attitudes are a prominent barrier, but CESCR’s does not give any framework or tools 
for identifying other barriers or emerging obstacles to women’s socio-economic rights. Without any 
framework states do not have the necessary guidance to be able to identify the specific and unique 
obstacles that exist within their domestic context and CESCR is not able to comprehensively 
monitor the implementation of ICESCR. CESCR’s prior General Comments that specifically 
examine gender equality and non-discrimination, similarly, focus on providing examples of best 
practices states should pursue and do not develop any analytical tools for evaluating state 
compliance with Article 2(2) and Article 3.77 The General Comments on equality and non-
discrimination are analyzed in greater detail in Section V. 
 
The Concluding Observations repeat the problems found in the General Comments. CESCR does 
addresses both entrenched problems and even some newer obstacles to gender equality, such as 
gender-based violence, discrimination in customary laws and the plight of migrant domestic 
workers.78 It also specifically highlights that steps to realize socio-economic rights such as anti-
poverty measures, legal aid and water programmes need to be targeted towards women.79 However, 
there is still significant room for improvement. There is no reference to the gender dimensions in 
relation to social security, food, housing or land. References to gender inequalities still tend to centre 
on the most obvious examples such as gender-based violence and gender pay gaps. In Kenya, 
CESCR only mentions in passing that pregnant learners are more likely to drop-out of school 
without identifying the specific barriers that are obstructing equality in the right to education. For 
instance, it does not assess if student drop-out because of inadequate daycare or breast-feeding 
facilities at school or if negative stereotypes from students and teachers pressure pregnant girls and 
new mothers into leaving school. Similarly, in relation to Namibia and Canada, as mentioned in 
Section I, CESCR overlooks discussing de facto pressing obstacles to women’s sexual and 
reproductive health. There may be many reasons that explain these oversights, such as CSOs not 
bringing these issues to the attention of the CESCR.80 However, the ability of the Committee to 
comprehensively monitor women’s socio-economic rights would be improved with monitoring tools 
that are gender sensitive.81  
 
IV. A Dual Approach to Monitoring Women’s Socio-Economic Rights 
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Having mapped out CESCR’s current approach and sifted rhetoric from reality on the monitoring of 
socio-economic rights and demonstrated the need for a gender sensitive approach, it is now possible 
to return to the central question and assess how gender equality fits into the monitoring of ICESCR. 
There are two potential approaches: (i) incorporating equality into the maximum available 
resources/progressive realization standard, the core obligations, the typology of duties and 
reasonableness; or (ii) establishing gender equality as a separate standard of review.  
 
There are pros and cons of each position. Practically, incorporating gender equality into the already 
established standards avoids creating a further tool in what is already a crowded monitoring field. It 
also avoids the complications of figuring out how gender equality functions with other standards. 
However, streamlining equality into the other standards runs a significant risk that gender equality in 
the implementation of socio-economic rights will continue to be overlooked. On a more principled 
basis, it may be conceptually illogical to integrate equality into other monitoring mechanisms and 
there may still be gaps in identifying breaches of Article 2(2) and 3. Establishing gender equality as a 
separate accountability tool could offer a more focused approach to women’s socio-economic rights. 
On the downside, this could add to the work load of the already under-funded and over-worked 
CESCR. 
 
To determine which option offers the best approach, this section begins by considering how to 
incorporate gender equality into the current monitoring standards. At the outset, it is also helpful to 
remember the purpose of monitoring standards: it is a tool that identifies when a state has failed to 
uphold its ICESCR commitments. The purpose of the analysis here is to examine if gender equality 
either as a stand-alone standard of review or united with the other monitoring standards is able to 
comprehensively and with a high degree of precision identify when the state has not fulfilled its 
obligation under Article 2(2) and 3 of ICESCR. To answer this question, this section examines the 
relationship between gender equality and all the standards CESCR discusses and actually uses.  
 
This section concludes that a gender equality framework enhances the monitoring of ICESCR 
process in multiple and complementary ways. Gender equality can and should be incorporated into 
the existing monitoring standards. Paying at attention to how current monitoring approaches can 
shine a spotlight on gender inequalities will immensely enrich women’s socio-economic rights. 
However, as demonstrated in Section II, each standard is targeted towards measuring different 
aspects of the realization of socio-economic rights. This means that none of the monitoring 
standards even when enriched with gender equality are able to capture all the ways women 
experience violations of their socio-economic rights. Under the current approach crucial aspects of 
gender inequality will remain in the shadows. Thus, there also needs to be an independent standard 
of review that can detect the various and nuanced ways in which women’s socio-economic rights are 
undermined. Although this may add to the work of the Committee, the alternative that the violations 
of women’s socio-economic rights remain invisible is unacceptable. The most comprehensive and 
coherent approach is to pursue both of the options identified above: to incorporate gender equality 
as far as possible into the current monitoring standards and to establish a separate gender equality 
framework.  
 
(i) Maximum Available Resources/Progressive Realization 
 
As more resources become available, the obligation on the state to progressively realize socio-
economic rights increases. Maximum available resources/progressive realization is potentially a 
robust analysis that examines the development and allocation of resources and measures the state’s 
efforts over a period of time. Although this standard has in practice been ignored by CESCR, 
scholarship has focused on three specific areas: (i) assessing the state’s available revenue and 
resources, for example, by looking at the state’s tax-structures,82 the availability of resources through 
international co-operation83 and even non-financial resources;84 (ii) examining the allocation of 
resources, particularly through analyzing if the state’s budget has provided sufficient funds to 
operationalize socio-economic rights;85 and (iii) developing benchmarks to measure the state’s 
progress.86  
 
There are potential benefits to integrating maximum available resources/progressive realization and 
gender equality. The development and allocation of resources can significantly re-entrench women’s 
disadvantage. International co-operation and assistance can come with criteria which limit gender 
equality such as by refusing to fund sexual and reproductive health services87 or requiring the 
government to cut fundamental public services which women disproportionately rely on.88 Tax 
structures can incentivize women to not work in the labour market.89 Similarly, the process taken to 
progressively realize rights can discriminate against women.90 Adding a gender equality lens to the 
maximum available resources/progressive realization standard will ensure that the state takes 
account of gender inequalities when developing and budgeting the state’s resources and that 
benchmarks used to monitor the progressive realization take full account of women’s disadvantage. 
Integrating these two standards has already begun with significant work being done to ensure 
budgets are gender and human rights compatible.91  
 
While gender equality can enhance the assessment of the state’s maximum available 
resources/progressive realization, there are limitations to using this enriched standard to detect 
breaches of women’s socio-economic rights. A maximum available resources/progressive 
realization/gender equality analytical lens will not capture crucial aspects of gender inequality, such 
as: how legislation strips women of their legal status and benefits when they marry a non-national92; 
the non-criminalization of marital rape;93 the non-recognition of unpaid work in divorce 
proceedings;94 the lack of legal protection for de facto unions;95 criminalizing health services only 
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women require;96 or different ages of marriage for men and women.97 Although these examples are 
seemingly violations of civil and political rights, there are also violations of ICESCR and undermine 
women’s equality under Article 6 (the right to work) Article 10 (protection of the family) Article 11 
(adequate standard of living) and Article 12 (health). An independent gender equality analysis would 
easily be able to capture these problems. When equality is tied to maximum available 
resources/progressive realization standard this narrows the scope of the analysis. The two standards 
in tandem can only examine gender equality in connection with resources. It is unable to see gender 
inequalities that impact on socio-economic rights that are outside of that remit, for example 
inequalities that are based in law or socio-cultural misrecognition.  
 
There are also conceptual difficulties in using gender equality and maximum available 
resources/progressive realization to identify breaches of Article 2(2) and 3 due to their 
fundamentally different approaches to the timing of the obligation. Maximum available 
resources/progressive realization is measuring the implementation of socio-economic rights over a 
period of time. Equality is an immediate obligation.98 The UN Working Group on Discrimination 
Against Women in Law and Practice forcefully holds: ‘women’s right to equality in economic and 
social rights is substantive, immediate and enforceable. It concerns the division of existing resources, 
not the development of resources, and therefore the principle of progressive realization does not 
apply.’99 Progressive realization is essentially a forward looking standard and is not able to diagnosis 
fundamental gender equality harms because equality is an immediate obligation. This is a significant 
obstacle to integrating these two standards. Some commentators have tried to find a way through 
this impasse and argued that only certain aspects of equality are immediately enforceable. Porter 
draws on the typology of duties and argues that states have an obligation to immediately respect and 
protect the right of non-discrimination. The obligation to fulfil equality through positive action is 
‘subject to available resources and progressive realization.’100 Similarly, Saul et al in their commentary 
on ICESCR explain CESCR’s holds that de jure discrimination must be removed immediately while 
‘failure to achieve de facto equality immediately may, in exceptional cases, be justified on the basis of 
a lack of available resources.’101 On this understanding, there is potential to further connect 
progressive realization and gender equality. 
 
The latter approach while offering a route to full integration is problematic because it risks 
undermining important gains in the evolution of equality. First, as Otto observes connecting 
obligations to fulfil to women’s equality under Article 3 implies that the other disadvantaged groups 
referred to in Article 2(2), such as religious and ethnic minorities, only enjoy ‘the limited negative 
protection of non-discrimination.’102 Due to the structure of ICESCR, fracturing equality and non-
discrimination means that the state only has a positive obligation to achieve gender equality but no 
similar obligation to other disadvantaged identity groups. This interpretation runs contrary to the 
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intentions of the drafters, who specifically rejected subjecting non-discrimination to progressive 
realization.103  
 
Second, this approach seemingly splits non-discrimination and equality into two separate concepts 
which is not consistent with international human rights law. CESCR observes that non-
discrimination and equality are ‘integrally related and mutually reinforcing.’104 The definition of 
discrimination adopted by CESCR, which draws on the definition of discrimination in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), holds 
that discrimination against women is any distinction made on the basis of sex which impairs the 
enjoyment ‘on the basis of equality of men and women of human rights.’105 The state is obligated to 
ensure that rights are enjoyed without discrimination and through the interpretative work of CESCR 
this means the state is required to ensure that any distinctions do not impede equality in socio-
economic rights. If a distinction does not uphold or further equality there has been discrimination. 
At international human rights law, equality is at the heart of discrimination. These two concepts are 
intimately connected together. Thus, attempts to divide non-discrimination and equality between 
immediate and progressive realization are conceptually impossible.106  
 
Third, another potential unintended consequence is that fracturing equality between immediate and 
progressive components potentially unravels the rich concept of equality that has been developed 
by, inter alia, the treaty bodies. CESCR observes that ‘guarantees of non-discrimination and equality 
in international human rights treaties mandate both de facto and de jure equality. De jure (or formal) 
equality and de facto (or substantive) equality are different but interconnected concepts.’107 Formal 
equality is closely tied, but not equated, to obligations of respect. Connecting immediacy/ 
obligations of respect/non-discrimination strongly implies that the state only has an immediate 
obligation to achieve formal equality. Substantive equality, which is closely associated with the 
obligation to fulfil, only has to be progressively realized. It implies that states are only under an 
immediate obligation to remove de jure barriers. There is no requirement on the state to immediately 
interrogate the current allocation of resources and the structure of laws, policies and programmes 
that entrench women’s disadvantage. While CESCR does allow for states to justify the failure to 
eliminate substantive inequality in extremely exceptional circumstances of resource constraint, it does 
not permit the state to refrain from taking immediate steps to redress substantive equality.108 Linking 
equality/obligation to fulfil/progressive realization characterizes substantive gender equality as some 
distance, quasi-unattainable goal that women must wait to enjoy. This potentially ignores the many 
aspects of substantive gender equality can be easily achieved with a reconfiguration of the state’s 
priorities and resources.  
 
An example helps explains the possible danger of dividing equality among immediate and 
progressive lines. Maternal mortality is still shockingly high in many countries around the world109 
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and these deaths are easily preventable.110 Maternal mortality is often not due to de jure or formal 
inequalities but the result of entrenched and systemic inequalities.111Addressing maternal mortality 
does not involve developing resources but the state taking seriously their commitment to gender 
equality and properly funding maternal health programmes.112 However, characterizing the 
obligation to fulfil equality as a progressive obligation means the state has space to continue to 
justify high rates of maternal mortality. This is a tragic and pressing issue of substantive gender 
equality that can and should be immediately addressed. The potential for maternal mortality and 
other similar under-prioritized aspects of substantive gender equality to be postponed through 
dividing the timing of equality obligations should give serious pause to adopting this approach.    
Equality can and should enhance the calculation of the state’s resources and the steps taken to fully 
realize socio-economic rights, but gender equality cannot be subject to progressive realization.  
 
Rejecting obligations to fulfil equality as a progressive obligation does raise questions on the proper 
relationship between equality and time in ICESCR. It is principally, strategically and pragmatically 
important to stress that gender equality is an immediate obligation. However, women’s disadvantage 
in socio-economic rights is often due to deeply embedded patriarchal and oppressive norms and 
structures. Modifying these norms and structures is a process that can require time. The CEDAW 
Committee’s approach to monitoring gender equality is illuminating here. It requires that the state 
to: (i) immediately assess de jure and de facto situation of women; and (ii) immediately take concrete 
steps to formulate and implement a policy that ‘is targeted as clearly as possible towards’ achieving 
substantive equality.113 Byrnes explains ‘the obligation to adopt a policy is an immediate one...[but] 
the obligation...also is continuing and includes the responsibility to monitor progress and adjust the 
policy as time passes.’114 The state is not setting a timetable for when to progressively realize achieve 
gender equality but instead ‘the emphasis is on movement forward...to build on [appropriate] 
measures continuously in the light of their effectiveness and new or emerging issues, in order to 
achieve the treaty’s goals.’115 Given the importance of harmonization within the UN system116 and 
CESCR fruitful history of drawing on the work of the CEDAW Committee,117 CESCR can adopt a 
similar approach and can immediately evaluate the state’s policy to achieve gender equality. This is a 
more coherent approach to monitoring Article 2(2) and Article 3 of ICESCR than fracturing equality 
into immediate and progressive components.  
 
(ii) Minimum Core and Core Obligations 
 
There is no accepted definition of the minimum core, as such there is potential to make a case that 
the minimum core should be defined as gender equality. Young’s critique of equating the minimum 
core with normative concepts although it referred to equality focused mostly on dignity. By equating 
the minimum core to gender equality, the state has not fulfilled ICESCR if it has not immediately 
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guaranteed gender equality in socio-economic rights. Both gender equality and minimum core are 
immediate obligations, so unlike maximum available resources/progressive realization, there is logic 
in tying these two standards together. Moreover, integrating these tools emphasizes the immediacy 
of gender equality. In theory a minimum core/gender equality standard would be able to detect the 
numerous ways that women’s socio-economic rights are violated as an equality framework is doing 
the analytical “heavy-lifting.” Prima facie, CESCR appears to be embracing this approach as it 
routinely holds that non-discrimination and gender equality are core obligations.118 
 
Similar to maximum available resources/progressive realization, there are practical risks to collapsing 
minimum core and gender equality. Liebenberg notes that the minimum core/core obligation 
implies that there are non-core obligations that are subject to progressive realization.119 This again 
raises the risk that equality will become fractured between core and non-core components. The 
temptation will be to see formal equality as a core obligation and substantive equality as non-core. 
This raises the similar issues discussed above in relation to dividing equality between immediate and 
progressive elements: that substantive equality will continue to be postponed and not treated as an 
immediate obligation. Exclusively equating the minimum core with gender equality may also limit to 
scope of protection under ICESCR. If gender equality is the minimum core the state has to achieve, 
this might exclude other disadvantaged groups from immediate protection of socio-economic rights. 
  
(iii) Typology of Duties 
 
The typology of duties is a tool for categorizing and understanding the nature of the state’s 
obligations. The CEDAW Committee regularly relies on this typology in the General 
Recommendations to explain why states have not upheld women’s rights under CEDAW.120 This 
suggests that there is a close connection between monitoring gender equality and the typology of 
duties.  
 
As Shue has recognized, the typology of duties is not a complete solution.121 It is an ‘abstract tool 
for describing multi-layered duties that arise from rights.’122 While it helpfully classifies the 
decriminalizing abortion as an obligation to respect and ensuring the justice system is sensitive to 
gender-based violence as an obligation to protect, the typology is not able to identify why these 
undermine women’s right to sexual and reproductive health. When reviewing a state’s action and 
inactions in the broad areas of life protected under ICESCR, the typology of duties functions to 
classify measures. The limits of the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil is apparent when facing 
emerging challenges to women’s socio-economic rights. Does the banning of the niqab violate girls 
and women’s right to education?123 Does it undermine women’s health to limit the prosecution of 
gender-based violence perpetuated by nationals abroad only to cases where the act is not 
criminalized in the country where it is committed?124 Does restricting the level of foreign funding for 
CSOs impact on women’s adequate standard of living?125 The typology of duties was not designed 
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and is not able to answer these questions. It is necessary to have an equality monitoring standard 
that detects gender inequalities and then the typology of duties can helpful characterize the nature of 
the state’s obligation to improve women’s socio-economic rights. These two standards are 
complementary but it is essential to have an equality framework to detect the underlying lack of 
implementation of women’s socio-economic rights.  
   
(iv) Reasonableness 
 
Reasonableness is a ‘flexible and context sensitive basis for evaluating socio-economic rights claims’ 
and there is space to integrate the two standards.126 CESCR has specifically stated that it will assess 
under reasonableness, if the states actions are non-discriminatory. In Rodriguez it did briefly examine 
if the state had discriminated as between prisoners and non-prisoners but this was not a fully-fleshed 
out analysis. Porter notes the close practical connection between these two standards. He observes 
that it ‘will be difficult to identify any claims from vulnerable groups suffering...that could not also 
be framed as non-discrimination.’127 In the South African context, the Constitutional Court affirmed 
the centrality of equality in the assessment of reasonableness.128 There has been criticism that the 
Court has not fully integrated equality into the reasonableness standard129, but for the purposes here, 
it is sufficient to note the drive towards conceptualizing inequalities in socio-economic rights as 
unreasonable.   
 
Enriching reasonableness with gender equality raises a similar problem with the typology of duties. 
Reasonableness on its own does not detect violations of women’s socio-economic rights. It is an 
elastic concept and not able to answer the questions posed above on the relationship between 
women’s socio-economic rights and the niqab, extraterritorial jurisdiction or foreign funding of 
CSOs. There needs to be a fully developed equality standard that can then be incorporated into the 
reasonableness approach if the OP-ICESCR is going to seriously assess women’s claims to socio-
economic rights.  
 
(v) Conclusions 
 
Drawing the threads together, the best approach to the monitoring of women’s socio-economic 
rights is to: (i) incorporating gender equality framework into the current monitoring standards; and 
(ii) establishing an independent monitoring tool designed specifically to capture gender inequalities.  
 There are significant benefits to enriching the current monitoring tools with gender equality.   
Maximum available resources/progressive realization and core obligations are more effective 
standards when they pay attention to the gender dimensions of developing and allocating resources 
and ensuring minimum standards for socio-economic rights. However, this is not a complete 
approach to ensuring compliance with Article 2(2) and 3. Principally, the maximum available 
resources/progressive standard cannot detect all the potential non-compliance of women’s socio-
economic rights and there is an inconsistency in the timing of the obligations. Pragmatically, linking 
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gender equality to maximum available resources/progressive realization and core obligations runs 
the significant risks of minimizing the state’s obligation to achieve substantive gender equality in 
women’s socio-economic rights. While the typology of duties helpful characterizes the nature of the 
states obligations towards women and the reasonableness standard is flexible enough to pay specific 
attention to gender inequalities, to be relevant to women’s socio-economic rights both depend on 
having a fully developed gender equality monitoring tool. Thus, it is necessary to also develop a tool 
that is specifically designed to capture gender inequalities in socio-economic rights.  
 
Arguing for a dual approach to monitoring women’s socio-economic rights does add an additional 
standard and may impact the workload of CESCR. In part this is necessary because of CESCR’s 
complex and multi-faceted approach to monitoring. Even though this proposed approach may come 
with a slight drawback, ensuring that the gender dimensions of socio-economic rights are properly 
identified outweighs this. Moreover, it puts CESCR in a strong position to constructively dialogue 
with the state and propose tailored and compelling recommendations.  
 
V. A Gender Equality Monitoring Framework 
 
The next task is to derive at a gender equality monitoring standard. The starting place is to assess 
how the text, context and object and purpose of ICESCR shape the definition of gender equality.130 
This section examines the treaty, the travaux preparatories, General Comments, the approach of the 
CEDAW Committee and academic proposals on how to monitor women’s rights under ICESCR. It 
argues that Fredman’s four dimensional model of equality offers an easy to use but sophisticated 
monitoring tool and demonstrates how this model can work in practice.  
 
(i) ICESCR and CESCR 
 
The starting place is the text of the treaty but similar to the other UN treaties, ICESCR does not 
define equality. The travaux preparatories do not discuss monitoring Article 2(2) and 3 and only shed 
minimal light on the meaning of equality in ICESCR. The drafters focused on only a few select 
issues: would affirmative action measures be permitted under Article 2(2) of ICESCR?; is a provision 
on gender equality redundant given that the treaty prohibits gender discrimination?; is non-
discrimination subject to progressive realization?; and is the state required to prohibit discrimination 
committed by a private individual?131  
 
It has been left to CESCR to develop the meaning of equality. Although its interpretation is not 
binding, it does have significant authoritative weight. CESCR firmly holds that ICESCR includes 
both formal and substantive equality. Formal equality ‘is achieved if a law or policy treats men and 
women in a neutral manner.’132 CESCR briefly explains that substantive equality ‘is concerned with 
the effects of laws, policies and practices and with ensuring that they do not maintain, but rather 
alleviate, the inherent disadvantage that particular groups’ experience.’133 Although this definition 
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importantly focuses on pre-existing disadvantage, it is not a robust concept of substantive equality, 
particularly in comparison with the CEDAW Committee’s definition, discussed below.134   
 
As demonstrated in Section II, CESCR has not yet translated these broad statements into a 
comprehensive evaluative tool. It is possible to glean from the General Comments several 
components that could form the basis of an evaluative tool. It has called on states to:  
• Pay attention to existing gender inequalities 
• Address gender stereotypes  
• Eliminate systemic discrimination  
• Identify appropriate indicators and benchmarks  
• Develop a plan of action  
• Take temporary special measures135  
 
(ii) CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee 
 
As the leading instrument on women’s rights, it is helpful to also look at how CEDAW and the 
CEDAW Committee define equality and monitor the implementation of women’s right. Again 
surprisingly, CEDAW does not define equality, but similar to CESCR the CEDAW Committee 
holds that it includes formal and substantive equality. The CEDAW Committee takes a multi-
faceted approach to substantive equality. It has defined it as requiring: differential treatment; an 
equal start; ‘equality of results’; ‘overcoming the underrepresentation of women and a redistribution 
of resources and power between men and women’; ‘[to] make choices without the limitation set by 
stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices’; and ‘real transformation of opportunities, institutions 
and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically determined male paradigms of power 
and life patterns.’ 136 While the CEDAW Committee is at the forefront in upholding women’s rights, 
it has been criticized for not translating this rich concept of equality into a monitoring framework.137 
There have been proposals, drawing on Fredman’s four dimensional model of equality, on how best 
to convert the Committee’s understanding of equality into an analytical tool.138 
 
(iii) Other Proposals 
 
There is a small body of academic commentary discussing the monitoring of Article 2(2) and 3. 
Recently, Chinkin has proposed criteria that a state would have to meet to uphold girl’s equal right 
to education.139 Her proposal is very specific to the education context and is not a designed to 
evaluate state’s compliance with gender equality and all of the socio-economic rights in ICESCR.  
 
Otto has also proposed framework but in practice her proposal is difficult to apply. It involves a 
series of classifications and questions: (i) is the measure gender neutral or differentiated? Does it 
treat sub-groups of women differently? (ii) Is the measure aimed to achieve structural equality? She 
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proposes a long list of factors to achieve substantive equality that in essence mirror CESCR and 
CEDAW Committee’s description of substantive equality. This is list is long, slightly repetitive and 
unyielding. Moreover, the list isn’t organized to mediate tensions in different aspects of gender 
equality. For instance, at-home prenatal medical care may redress women’s disadvantage in health 
care but re-enforce women’s exclusion from public life, particularly in societies that are heavily 
gender segregated. Otto does not explain how her guidelines interact so as to identify and resolve 
these harms. The next steps, she proposes, are to ask: (iii) what is the qualitative outcome for 
women? for men? (iv) what is the qualitative outcome for subgroups of women? subgroups of men? 
(v) if substantive equality has not been achieved does the law need to be redesigned?140 While, this is 
an essential component, her proposal is focused on outcomes which may overlook law, policies or 
programmes that on their face undermine substantive equality. For instance, there is a proposal in 
the UK only allowing women to receive child benefits for a third child when she can prove the third 
child is a consequence of sexual violence.141It is not entirely clear if Otto’s proposed framework 
would be able to capture the recognition harms in the law that paint women in poverty as 
promiscuous, benefit-leaches or the gross invasion of privacy.   
 
(iv) A New Approach 
 
Fredman’s four dimensional model of substantive equality overcomes these limitations and is an 
ideal framework for monitoring ICESCR. Her model pursues four-overlapping dimensions: 
breaking the cycle of disadvantage; promoting respect for dignity and worth; participation and 
accommodating difference by achieving structural change.142 The first element, breaking the cycle of 
disadvantage, recognizes that individuals and groups have suffered because of their personal 
characteristics. To redress this imbalance, specific and positive measures are required, including 
temporary special measures. The second element addresses recognition harms such as: harassment, 
prejudice, stereotypes, stigmas, negative cultural attitudes, indignity and humiliation. Third, the 
participation dimension requires inclusion of women in all public, private, political and social 
decision making processes. Fourth, the structural dimension requires institutions rather than 
individuals to change.   
 
This model draws together and synthesizes the factors that CESCR refers to in the General 
Comments on equality and non-discrimination. It is not a definition but is specifically designed to be 
an evaluative tool to ‘assist in modifying laws, policies and practices to better achieve substantive 
equality.’143 As Fredman explains, ‘the aim of the multi-dimensional approach is...an evaluative one, 
to provide a set of criteria to determine whether a law, policy or practice or institution is likely to 
fulfill the right to equality and points to ways in which they should be reformed better to do so.’144 It 
sophisticated but “user-friendly” which is crucial given the budget and time constraints of CESCR.  
 
Unlike previous proposals, Fredman’s model can mediate tensions between facets of gender 
equality. Framing substantive equality in terms of dimensions ‘focuses on the interaction and 
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synergies’ between different elements ‘rather than asserting a pre-established lexical priority’145 and 
when there are conflicts ‘the aim is to look for...compromise, rather than suggesting that substantive 
equality pursue one of the aims at the cost of obliterating the others.’146 For instance, using this 
framework highlights how conditional cash transfers provide to women in poverty can address 
economic disadvantage but perpetuate misrecognition harms that women in poverty need incentives 
to provide education and health care to their children and that women are primary care-givers.147 
Achieving substantive equality and synergy between the four dimensions requires consultation with 
women in poverty and points towards unconditional cash transfers coupled with structural 
investment in public services. Fredman’s model of substantive equality has been highly influential. It 
has been adopted by UN Women in their latest flagship report148 and is implicitly being relied upon 
by CESCR and other UN treaty bodies.149 
 
(v) Integrating Substantive Equality into the Monitoring of ICESCR 
 
The four dimensional model of equality can enrich the established standards and can function as an 
independent tool to ensure a comprehensive approach to monitoring ICESCR. Linking “maximum 
available resources/progressive realization” and Fredman’s substantive equality ensures that the 
development and allocation of resources and benchmarks and indicators promote women’s equality. 
For instance, a substantive equality lens, particularly the participation dimension ensures that women 
have a voice in setting progressive realization standards to ensure their needs are not overlooked. 
CESCR can call attention for the need for gender sensitive budgets and macroeconomic policies. 
The four dimensional model of equality becomes a crucial facet of core obligations. This connection 
stresses the immediacy of taking all appropriate measures to achieve gender equality. Drawing on the 
CEDAW Committee, CESCR can hold the state to account for immediately developing a national 
plan and implementation strategy that is based on substantive equality.  
 
To ensure that ICESCR identifies all the ways women’s human rights are violated, the four-
dimensional model can be applied as an independent monitoring tool. It can shine a bright spotlight 
on the relationship between gender and socio-economic rights. The dimensions and the interaction 
between them can comprehensively identify breaches of Article 2(2) and 3 of ICESCR. It can help 
ensure that CESCR does not have any blind spots. It directs CESCR to examine from four different 
dimensions—disadvantage, recognition, participation and structural—women’s right, inter alia, to 
food, water, housing and education. For instance, in the Concluding Observations for Kenya and 
Namibia, CESCR expresses concern about the high drop rates of children from school. Applying 
the equality monitoring tool requires CESCR to consider: (i) how the impact of direct or indirect 
school fees and domestic responsibilities negatively impacts girls right to education (disadvantage 
dimension); (ii) how do the attitudes of teachers and parents re-enforce stereotypes?; do girls 
experience violence to, from and at school? (recognition dimension); (iii) do schools have high-
quality and culturally sensitive sanitation facilities for girls? (structural dimension); and (iv) has the 
state consulted with women and girls, including the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups 
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(participation dimension)?150 For Canada, CESCR can highlight that efforts to address socio-
economic disadvantage of indigenous peoples need to be sensitive inter-group differences. 
Indigenous women in Canada are among the most vulnerable groups in Canadian society.151 CESCR 
can recommend that Canada be cognizant of this disadvantaged position and ensure that all 
programmes specifically address the nexus of gender and indigenous status (recognition dimension). 
In a similar vein, CESCR’s discussion of land rights issues and harmful cultural practices in Namibia 
is almost entirely gender neutral. Using an independent equality monitoring tool, CESCR can 
encourage the state to undertake awareness raising programmes targeted to traditional leaders on 
women’s rights to inheritance and ownerships and gender equality (recognition element) and 
facilitate dialogue between traditional leaders and women’s organisations to promote internal reform 
of customary laws and harmful cultural practices (participation element). CESCR can then draw on 
the typology of duties to classify the state’s nature of the steps the state should take.  Removing 
gender discriminatory provisions in the Indian Act in Canada is an obligation to respect, and 
directing police officers to patrol the route girls take to school in Kenya is an obligation to protect 
women’s land rights in Namibia by facilitating dialogue is an obligation to fulfil. The proposed 
independent framework provides the analytical richness necessary to complement the typology of 
duties and give meaningful content to the reasonableness standard.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
The current approach to monitoring ICESCR is multi-faceted and complex. It can identify certain, 
but not all, violations of women’s socio-economic rights. To address this shortcoming it is necessary 
to pursue a dual-strategy where (i) an independent equality framework is established; which (ii) can 
also be used to enrich the traditional monitoring tools. This article proposes that CESCR adopt 
Fredman’s four dimensional model of equality for monitoring women’s rights under ICESCR. By 
examining each of the rights in ICESCR from the perspective of women’s disadvantage, gender 
recognition harms, structural and institutional barriers and participation, CESCR can hold states to 
account and ensure greater respect for women’s rights.  
 
It is important to acknowledge this is not a complete solution to all the problems of monitoring for 
women’s socio-economic rights. There are still concerns on CESCR’s consistency when reviewing 
the implementation of ICESCR. States and CSOs may not always provide the necessary information 
to conduct a robust substantive equality analysis. However, the framework does provides the tools 
to direct CESCR to ask the necessary question in the constructive dialogue process to overcome as 
far as possible any knowledge gaps. Even with the shortcomings of the international accountability 
system, the proposed dual approach to monitoring women’s socio-economic rights is an important 
step forward in fully engendering ICESCR. 
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